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Model-Driven Safety Analysis of Closed-Loop
Medical Systems
Miroslav Pajic, Rahul Mangharam, Oleg Sokolsky, David Arney, Julian Goldman and Insup Lee
Abstract— In modern hospitals, patients are treated using
a wide array of medical devices that are increasingly interacting
with each other over the network, thus offering a perfect example
of a cyber-physical system. We study the safety of a medical
device system for the physiologic closed-loop control of drug
infusion. The main contribution of the paper is the verification
approach for the safety properties of closed-loop medical device
systems. We demonstrate, using a case study, that the approach
can be applied to a system of clinical importance. Our method
combines simulation-based analysis of a detailed model of the
system that contains continuous patient dynamics with model
checking of a more abstract timed automata model. We show
that the relationship between the two models preserves the crucial
aspect of the timing behavior that ensures the conservativeness
of the safety analysis. We also describe system design that can
provide open-loop safety under network failure.
Index Terms—closed-loop medical systems, model-based devel-
opment, safety analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
Clinical scenarios for critical care patients often involve
large numbers of medical devices. Some of these devices,
such as bedside monitors, provide vital information about
the state of the patient. Other devices, for example, infusion
pumps, provide treatment. That is, they affect the state of the
patient, for example, by infusing medication. Medical device
systems, considered together with the patient and caregivers,
represent an important class of cyber-physical systems. Patient
safety is the primary concern in such systems, yet reasoning
about patient safety is very difficult because of insufficient
understanding of the dynamics of human body response to
treatment. Human errors, another important source of patient
safety problems, are also difficult to reason about in the
framework of conventional embedded system development.
It is natural to view a clinical scenario as a control system, in
which the patient is a plant, bedside monitors are sensors and
infusion pumps are actuators. Traditionally, caregivers perform
the role of the controller in such a system. This means that
the caregiver needs to continuously monitor all sensor devices
and apply appropriate treatment. The large number of devices
to monitor and control makes the job of the caregiver very
difficult. On top of that, a caregiver is typically responsible
for several patients. An emergency may divert the caregiver’s
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attention elsewhere, making him or her miss an important
event. As a result, patient safety may suffer. Multiple such
occurrences are documented in the clinical literature.
The human caregiver will always play an indispensable part
of most clinical scenarios. However, in many cases automatic
controllers can play important roles, reducing the burden on
the caregiver and avoiding the possibility of human errors. A
number of such cases has been documented in the ASTM stan-
dard for the Integrated Clinical Environment [1], developed
by the Medical Device Plug-and-Play Interoperability pro-
gram(mdpnp.org) [2]. Although many medical devices today
have network interfaces and can send sensed data across the
network, few can be controlled remotely. Vendors of medical
equipment continue to stay away from closed-loop scenarios.
The rationale is that it is difficult to reason about patient
safety in closed-loop scenarios. Such reasoning is necessary
for medical devices, which have to be approved for use by
government regulators who assess their safety and effective-
ness. A particular challenge arises from the complexity of a
complex interplay between the continuous dynamics of the
patient reaction to treatment and the discrete nature of the
controller and communication network. The dynamics of the
patient body is not well understood and exhibits parametric
uncertainty and high variability between different patients.
To overcome this difficulty, we explore a model-driven
approach that allows us to prove safety properties of devices
on the modeling level and ensures that abstract models used
in the verification process are sound with respect to the actual
dynamics of the system. Both the abstract, formal model and
the detailed, informal model are needed in the process of
verification, validation, and regulatory approval of closed-loop
medical device systems. On the one hand, formal models
allow us to exhaustively explore the possible behaviors of the
system and prove its safety. On the other hand, detailed models
allow us to use high-fidelity simulation that take real system
dynamics into account. Both kinds of results can be used to
make the case for regulatory approval.
We start with a detailed model of the system in Simulink.
The model contains a patient model that reflects continuous
pharmacokinetic dynamics of drug absorption by the patient
body. To reflect the variation between different patient popula-
tions, the patient model incorporates uncertainty in the values
of its parameters. The Simulink model enables high-fidelity
simulations of the system in various scenarios. Yet, currently
there are no tools supporting the verification of hybrid systems
(i.e., systems consisted of both discrete-time components and
continuous-time dynamics) modeled in Simulink that are both
nondeterministic and with uncertain parameters. Most existing
tools for Simulink are limited to testing-based analysis that
does not guarantee the coverage of parameter space.
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To prove safety of the system, we express the safety property
as a timing relationship between system components. We then
model the system using the formalism of timed automata in
the UPPAAL tool [3].1 The model abstracts away continuous
dynamics of the system, replacing it with timing constraints.
The values for the timing constraints are obtained from the
continuous dynamics of system components using the detailed
Simulink model. It is necessary to guarantee that the patient
model in UPPAAL over-approximates the patient’s dynamics
with respect to the utilized control algorithm. For that, we
present a procedure that utilizes convex optimization to calcu-
late an upper bound on critical timing values for a linear time-
invariant (LTI) model with uncertain parameters and show that
behaviors of the UPPAAL model is always within this bound.
There is a need to develop a methodology for the analysis
of safety properties of closed-loop medical device systems [4].
In this paper we present a case-study focused on a system of
clinical importance. In the case study, we prove that the system
is safe under a set of assumptions. We then demonstrate that a
violation of these assumptions (e.g., by a more realistic fault
model) can make the system unsafe. Finally, we propose a
solution to restore system safety under the new fault model.
The approach presented in this paper is intended to serve as
a reference point, a step toward a model-based methodology
for safety analysis of closed-loop medical device systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the medical case study and presents the system
architecture that we used to describe our approach. Section III
explains the use of Simulink models of the system to analyze
safety with no failure assumption. It also describes a procedure
used to translate safety requirements into timing constraints
in cases where system is modeled as a continuous-time LTI
system with uncertain parameters. Section IV describes the
UPPAAL models of the system and safety properties we have
verified. Section V proposes modifications to the system to
deal with failures and provides an argument that the new sys-
tem guarantees open-loop safety. The last section summarizes
the paper and identifies the future work.
II. CASE STUDY
In this section, we describe a case study that represents one
of the MD PnP interoperability clinical scenarios [1]. In the
past, we have built a demonstration of this scenario [5]. Several
variants of this system have been presented at the American
Society of Anesthesiologists annual meeting in 2007, where it
won first place in the scientific exhibits, at the 2008 HIMMS
(Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society)
Congress, and at the 2008 CIMIT Innovation Congress.
We have built the system according to the Integrated Clinical
Environment (ICE) architecture, developed by the MD PnP
project. Figure 1 shows the main components of an ICE-
compliant system. The patient and caregiver are the human
elements of the system. The Supervisor is the computer
system that runs the control algorithm. Medical devices are
connected, through adapters where necessary, to the Network
Controller, which keeps track of connected devices and their
capabilities. The Data Logger records pertinent network traffic
1Due to space constraints, we do not present the formal definition and
semantics of timed automata. These definitions can be obtained from [3].
Caregiver
Physical Connections 
to Patient
Supervisor
Data 
Logger
Network Controller
External 
Network
Device 1
Adapter
Device 2
Adapter
Device 3
Adapter
Patient
Patient-Centered 
Data Network
Caregiver’s User 
Interface
Fig. 1. MD PnP Architecture with Patient-in-the-Loop Automatic Control.
for later forensic analysis and external networks such as the
hospital information system are connected through an external
interface. In our case study, we did not model the data logger
since it does not affect our runtime safety analysis.
A. Clinical Use Case
The selected scenario involves a patient connected to a
patient-controlled analgesia (PCA) infusion pump. PCA infu-
sion pumps are commonly used to deliver opioids for pain
management, for instance after surgery. Patients have very
different reactions to the medications and require very different
dosages and delivery schedules. PCA pumps give the patient a
button to press to request a dose when they decide they want it
rather than using a schedule fixed by a caregiver. Some patients
may decide they prefer a higher level of pain to the nausea
the drugs may cause and can press the button less often, while
patients who need a higher dose can press it more often.
A major problem with opioid medications in general is that
an excessive dose, or overdose, can cause respiratory failure.
A properly programmed PCA system should not allow an
overdose because it is programmed with limits on the number
of doses it will deliver, regardless of how often the button
is pushed. However, this safety mechanism is not sufficient to
protect all patients. Some patients still receive overdoses if the
pump is misprogrammed, if the pump programmer overesti-
mates the maximum dose a patient can receive, if the wrong
concentration of drug is loaded into the pump, or if someone
other than the patient presses the button (PCA-by-proxy),
among other causes. PCA pumps have been involved in a large
number of adverse events [6], and existing safeguards such as
drug libraries and programmable limits are not adequate to
address all the scenarios seen in clinical practice [7].
The system we are considering aims to improve patient
safety in such scenarios by introducing a supervisor that
monitors patient data for the early signs of respiratory failure
and can stop the infusion and sound an alarm if the patient
experiences an adverse event. We use a pulse oximeter device
that receives physiological signals from a clip on the patient’s
finger and processes them to calculate heart rate and SpO2
outputs, where SpO2 is the measure of blood oxygenation.
Note that, at the time of writing, there are no PCA pumps on
the market that are capable of being remotely controlled. In
the demonstration system, we used the PCA pump prototype
we have built during the Generic Infusion Pump project [8].
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PCA Monitoring System
    PCA Pump
(With patient button)
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ADAPTER
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Fig. 2. Hardware for PCA Demo System.
B. System Architecture
Figure 2 shows the components of the PCA safety system.
The system components are described below. Figure 3 shows
the devices and essential data flow in this control loop. In the
case-study pulse oximeter acts as the Monitoring System from
Figure 2. It receives physiological signals from the patient and
processes them to produce heart rate and SpO2 outputs. The
Supervisor gets these outputs and makes a control decision,
possibly sending a stop signal to the PCA Pump. Unless it
is stopped by the Supervisor, the PCA pump delivers a drug
to the patient at its programmed rate that corresponds to the
selected operating mode. The patient model gets the drug rate
as an input and updates the drug level in the patient’s body.
This in turn influences the physiological output signals through
a drug absorption function.
1) PCA Infusion Pump: The PCA pump in the case study
operates in the following way. Before operation, the pump
is programmed by the caregiver, who sets the pump’s op-
erating mode, normal rate of infusion, the increased rate of
a bolus, and bolus duration. Some PCA pumps also can be
programmed to limit the total amount of drug to be infused.
Once programmed and started, the pump delivers the drug
at the normal rate until it is stopped or the bolus button is
pressed. From that moment, it delivers drug at the bolus rate
for the specified duration and then returns to the normal rate.
The pump is equipped with a number of built-in sensors that
detect internal malfunctions such as the presence of air in the
tubes that deliver the drug. When a problem is detected, the
pump is stopped. We do not consider such malfunctions in this
case study and do not represent the built-in alarm mechanism.
Finally, the pump is equipped with a network interface,
which allows the pump to transmit its status across the network
to other devices such as the logger. For the purpose of our
scenario, we assume that the network interface allows the
pump to accept control signals. A stop control signal will set
the current infusion rate to zero, while the start signal will set
the normal infusion rate (regardless of the state of the pump
before it was stopped).
2) Monitoring System: Patients using a PCA pump are
usually also attached to patient monitors that record the pa-
tient’s EKG, blood pressure, respiratory rate, and SpO2. These
monitors sound alarms if the measured values are outside
thresholds set by the caregivers, but do not stop the infusion.
Thus, the patient continues to receive more of an overdose
while the caregiver responds, assesses the patient, and if a
real problem occurred, finally stops the pump.
last output value 97 - 100 94 - 96 90 - 93 85 - 89 < 85
new window size 10 8 7 6 4
TABLE I
SLIDING WINDOW SIZE FOR PULSE OXIMETER
In this study, we look at using SpO2 and heart rate measure-
ments as the basis for a physiologic closed-loop control system
that can stop the PCA pump and halt the dose of opioid while
sounding an alarm if respiratory distress is detected. Both of
these measurements can be produced by a device called Pulse
Oximeter. This device is equipped with a finger clip sensor that
shines two wavelengths of light through the patient’s finger.
The measured light intensity reflects the blood oxygen content,
which can change rapidly.
The pulse oximeter samples the patient’s SpO2 at regular
intervals, processes them, and outputs an averaged result [9].
It calculates the average using a variable-sized sliding window.
The window size varies with the last output value. The reason
for changing the window size is that a smaller sample size
gives faster, but potentially less accurate results. When SpO2
values are low, quick response is more important than filtering
out transient noise. When SpO2 is high, increasing the window
size helps to filter out transient low values at the expense of
less frequent updates. Since the samples are at regular intervals
and a varying number of samples are used to calculate the
output, the output is updated irregularly. The size of the sliding
window used in the case study is determined using a simple
table shown in Table I. Note that this table does not reflect
the details of any real implementation but rather attempts to
capture the essential behavior of a typical pulse oximeter.
3) Caregiver Model: The caregiver in this system programs
the PCA pump and reacts to alarms. The control system is
closed loop, so no intervention by the caregiver is necessary
to stop the infusion when a problem is detected. The caregiver
can react to restart the system if it has stopped in reaction to
a false alarm, or when a problem such as a slipped patient
sensor is fixed.
4) Patient Model: To model the Patient we use a pharma-
cokinetic patient model for intravenous delivery of anesthetic
drugs presented in [10] (module 12). The model utilizes a
common 3-compartment model to describe the changes in drug
concentration in blood and tissue. The patient is described as a
continuous-time LTI system with a state space representation:
Signal Processing 
Time
Pulse Oximeter
Output 
Physiological 
Signals
Drug Level
Patient Model
Drug Absorption 
Function
SpO2 & HR 
Levels
Algorithm 
Processing Time
Supervisor
Pump 
Commands
PCA Pump
Pump Processing 
TimeDrug Infusion
Drug Request
Fig. 3. PCA System Control Loop.
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C˙1C˙2
C˙3
 = [−(k12 + k13 + k10) k21 k31k12 −k12 0
k13 0 −k31
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
[
C1
C2
C3
]
+
 1V10
0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
I
dl = [1 0 0]︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
[
C1
C2
C3
]
(1)
where Ci, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} is the drug concentration in the ith
compartment, I is the mass infusion rate (in mass/unit of time)
of the drug, kij are patient specific constants and V1 is the
volume of the blood plasma compartment. Since compartment
1 presents blood plasma, its concentration is mapped into the
drug level concentration dl as in (1).
Using the above model, we represent the instantaneous level
of medication in the patient’s body as a single variable dl. This
variable is linked to the patient’s heart rate and SpO2 by the
drug absorption function, which represents how the patient
reacts to the dose received over time. Using dl value, the state
space of the patient is partitioned into three regions: in pain
(under-medicated), pain-controlled (adequate medication), or
over-medicated. These regions, shown in Figure 4, are defined
as follows:
• The Safe region is defined as the region where the Patient’s
readings are below some predefined threshold values that
guarantee that Patient’s vitals are not endangered.
• If the patient is over-medicated to the point that he or
she starts experiencing respiratory distress, we consider it an
overdose. Thus, we define the Critical region where Patient’s
life is in danger or there is a chance that irreparable damage
can occur. The overdose condition is referred as border of the
Critical region.
• The Alarming region defined as the region where Patient’s
vitals are not endangered but there is a reasonable concern
that the Patient can be forced to the Critical region.
Any treatment needs to make sure that the patient stays out
of the critical region, and we use this requirement as the main
safety property of the system that needs to be ensured. In this
case study, since the drug level is estimated from the patient’s
SpO2 and heart rate, we defined the boundary of the Critical
region in terms of these values and set it to HSpO22 = 70%
for SpO2 (and HHR2 = 11.5 beats/min for heart rate), a clear
indication of respiratory failure.
It is worth noting here that some patients react very quickly
to a drug dose, while others react more slowly. Furthermore,
a mapping between the drug level on one side and measured
SpO2 level and heart rate is also patient specific. Therefore,
by adjusting this function, we can tune the model to different
patient types. However, in all these cases patient reaction
to drug can be described as in (1), where patient specific
Fig. 4. Regions of Patient’s conditions.
coefficients belong to predefined regions and fully determine
the patient’s behavior.
To analyze the dynamics of the patient’s pharmacokinetic
model, we have designed the system model in Simulink (the
model is described in next section). This enables simulation
and analysis of the system’s behavior under different scenarios.
5) Supervisor: The supervisor is a running program in the
system that communicates with other devices and executes
clinical application scripts (CAS’s). A CAS is a script that
implements a particular clinical use case. The clinical ap-
plication in this case study is to control the loop shown in
Figure 3. The Supervisor receives the patient’s heart rate and
SpO2 measurements from the pulse oximeter and uses this
information to decide whether the PCA infusion pump should
be allowed to run or immediately stopped.
In the case study, two simple Supervisor’s control algo-
rithms were designed. In the first algorithm, after the pump
is activated the decision to stop the pump is made as soon
as the patient heart rate or SpO2 readings fall below a fixed
threshold. The threshold value needs to ensure that the patient
does not enter the Critical region despite the delay in detecting
the problem and delivering the control signal to the pump. For
the case study, we defined the threshold as HSpO21 = 90% for
the SpO2 and HHR1 = 57 beats/min for heart rate. Values
below these thresholds typically indicate “a clinical concern”
([11], p. 45), meaning that a caregiver needs to be notified. The
supervisor notifies the caregiver when the threshold is crossed,
as it sends the message to stop the pump. Values between H1
and H2 are thus referred as the Alarming region. The width
of the alarming region is denoted as ∆H =| H2 −H1 |.
The second control algorithm is similar, with a small
difference that in this case the pump is always activated for a
fixed, predefined duration of time. Therefore, the Supervisor
does not need to send commands to stop the pump unless, as
in the first design, it detects that the Patient have entered the
Alarming region. In this case, the Supervisor again sends a
command to stop the pump and alerts the caregiver.
III. MODELING SYSTEM’S DYNAMICS IN SIMULINK
The overall structure of the Simulink model follows that of
the model shown in Figure 2. The Simulink blocks are used
to capture the dynamics of the PCA infusion pump, Pulse
Oximeter (PO), Patient model, and Supervisor, described in
Section II. In addition, they are used to define the notion of
the safe, critical, and alarming regions precisely. Using the
overall structures and timing properties of the components,
this section describes when the system is safe and when it is
not safe. Finally, it identifies the limitations of the model with
respect to its use in system verification.
A. Simulink Models
The PO is implemented as described in Section II (a
more detailed description of the PO design is presented in
Section IV). It monitors the Patient’s HR and SpO2 level and
informs the Supervisor about these values. Figure 5 presents
the Patient’s model, where effects of the drug flow are depicted
using the Patient model described in Section II. Therefore, the
Patient is modeled as a continuous-time LTI system where
matrices A,B and C are defined as in (1). For the Patient
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Fig. 6. Patient’s response on the pump activities.
model that describes a particular population of subjects, we
use the parameters for a scenario of intravenous delivery of
anesthetic drugs ([10], page 694). Here, the kinetic values
in (1) are initialized as:
kˆ10 = 0.152 min−1, kˆ12 = 0.207 min−1, kˆ13 = 0.040 min−1
kˆ21 = 0.092 min−1, kˆ31 = 0.048 min−1, Vˆ1 = 12 liters. (2)
In the general case, to be able to express Patient dynamics for
different types of patient populations, it is not possible to fix
a value for each of the parameters kij . Therefore, to model
the Patient’s dynamics in the general case, each parameter kij
is initialized with a value within a closed region:
kij ∈
[
kˆij −∆kij , kˆij + ∆kij
]
(3)
V1 ∈
[
Vˆ1 −∆V, Vˆ1 + ∆V
]
,
which is a simplified version of the function presented in [12].
This effectively means that matrices A and B, defined in (1),
in the general case (i.e., for all types of patients) belong to a
specific polyhedron. The patient’s Heart Rate (HR) and SpO2
level are extracted from its drug level using a linear mapping,
as shown in Figure 5. As the mapping between the drug level,
measured SpO2 level and heart rate is patient-specific, it is
necessary to include this additional level of uncertainty into
the model. Therefore, in the implemented model, the gain in
matrix C (i.e., element C11) can also take values within a
pre-specified region [1−∆c, 1 + ∆c].
To analyze the patient’s dynamics for parameter values
from (2), the patient’s behavior was simulated for a case when
the drug is repeatedly delivered for 1 hour followed with a 1-
hour pause. Figure 6 presents the obtained changes in HR and
SpO2 levels during the period of almost 3 hours.
B. Analysis of System Safety Properties
For the aforementioned system we consider the safety
requirement that the PCA pump will always be stopped before
Patient’s Critical region is reached. Since the Supervisor can
be configured to operate in two different modes, depending
on the Supervisor’s mode the safety requirement could be
translated into different conditions imposed on the system.
Therefore, in this section the safety requirement is analyzed
separately for both Supervisor modes.
1) Safety conditions for the first Supervisor design: In
the first supervisor’s design, patient’s requests automatically
activate the drug flow. The Supervisor is implemented to stop
the PCA pump only if the Patient reaches the Alarming region.
Otherwise, while the Patient is in the Safe region, the pump
provides continuous drug flow to the patient. We note that
the safety requirement (that the Patient never enters into the
Critical region) is satisfied if the following condition is met:
tPOdel+tnet+tSup+tnet+tPump+tP2PO+tPCA2P ≤ tcrit
(4)
where:
• tPOdel - worst case delay caused by PO; it can be
calculated from the PO specification, see Table I,
• tnet - worst case network delay; the value depends on
used network protocol,
• tSup - worst case delay introduced by the Supervisor; it
can be calculated from the Supervisor model,
• tPump - worst case delay introduced by the PCA pump;
the value can be calculated from the pump model,
• tP2PO - worst case latency from the moment when
command is sent from the PCA pump until the drug starts
(or stops) flowing; it depends on type of connection used,
• tPCA2P - worst case delay between the moment the drug
flow is activated and the moment when it reaches the
Patient; it also depends on the type of used connection,
• tcrit - Patient’s critical time, a shortest time that Patient
spends in Alarming region before it enters Critical region;
it can be calculated from the Patient model (see below).
If (4) is satisfied, it can be guaranteed that the Supervisor
will be able to determine that the Patient has entered the
Alarming zone and stops the PCA pump before the Patient
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switches from the Alarming to the Critical zone. The values
for the time constants are shown in Table II. All values, beside
tnet, can be obtained from the system specification. Here, for
the safety analysis we assume that the network latency tnet is
bounded by 0.5s and we will try to relax the bound later.
Remark 1: Currently there exist several Simulink-based
network simulators that can be used for the network modeling
(e.g., TrueTime). However, from the perspective of safety
analysis and relation (4), the network can be modeled as a
random delay with delay distribution that matches the desired
application scenario. It is worth noting here that the network
induced delay is not fixed and it depends on the underlying
network controller (e.g., 802.11 MAC with distributed (DCF)
or point (PCF) coordination function) and environmental con-
ditions (e.g., traffic, presence of interference). Furthermore,
although implemented network protocols can improve the
overall Quality of Service (QoS), in the general case when
wireless networks are used the delay can not be bounded, no
matter which communication protocol is utilized. Therefore,
even though we start with the assumption on bounded network
delay, we also consider the cases with unbounded network
delay (i.e., messages can be lost), along with its consequences
on the system’s safety.
The main problem in determining whether the safety con-
dition is met is to find the value for tcrit. If a mathematical
model for the patient is known, and patient-specific (fixed)
parameters can be obtained, this value can be analytically or
numerically determined. In our model, for a specific popula-
tion of subjects we can use fixed parameters as in (2). Since
the Patient is modeled as an LTI process when the drug flow
is on, time-responses for drug level, HR and SpO2 level have
the same general form:
cmin + a1e
−λ1t + a2e−λ2t + a3e−λet (5)
where λ1 = −0.0079, λ2 = −0.0023, λ3 = −0.0007
are eigenvalues of matrix A = Aˆ (from (2)) and constants
cmin, a1, a2 and a3 belong to different sets of constants
(depending whether we consider the drug level, HR or SpO2)
for a fixed drug infusion rate.
To calculate tcrit consider time instances, t1 and t2, when
the Patient enters the Alarming and Critical regions, respec-
tively. If the Patient is continuously pushed toward the Critical
region (which in this case means that the pump is continu-
ously delivering drug to the Patient), then tcrit = t2 − t1.
Considering the Alarming region boundary for SpO2 it holds:
HSpO2i = c
SpO2
min + a
SpO2
1 e
−λ1ti + aSpO22 e
−λ2ti + aSpO23 e
−λeti . Thus,
we can calculate tcrit from H
SpO2
1 −HSpO22 = ∆HSpO2 .
For our model the Patient’s dynamics is mostly deter-
mined by the maximal eigenvalue λ3, which is approximately
0.0007s−1, but the other eigenvalues have effect too. Thus,
tcrit is a couple of orders of magnitude bigger than the sum
of all other timing parameters from (4). For HSpO21 = 90% and
HSpO22 = 70% we have tcrit ≈ 581.2 s ≈ 9.68 min. Therefore,
for these patient parameters that correspond to a particular
population, our system always satisfies the safety requirement
if the assumption that all messages are delivered is valid.
time delay tPOdel tnet tSup tPump tP2PO tPCA2P
value 1s 0.5s 0.2s 0.1s 2s 2s
TABLE II
WORST CASE DELAYS
2) Safety Analysis for the System with Uncertain Parame-
ters: The aforementioned procedure for tcrit calculation can
be used only when exact values for parameters used in matrices
A, B and C are known. As mentioned earlier in the section, in
the general case we can only claim that matrices A, B and C
belong to polyhedrons <{A}, <{B} and <{C}, respectively.
For example, a polyhedron <{A} can be defined as:
<{A} = {A| −∆A  A− Aˆ  ∆A} (6)
where  denotes element-wise inequality and for all ∆kij
from Eq. (3) the matrix ∆A is defined as
∆A =
−(∆k12 + ∆k13 + ∆k10) ∆k21 ∆k31∆k12 −∆k12 0
∆k13 0 −∆k31
 .
Polyhedrons <{B} and <{C} can be similarly defined.
To model different types of patient populations, in the
Patient model each of the predefined parameters can vary
up to 10% from its initial value (e.g., ∆k12 = 0.1k12).2 In
this case, to check the safety condition from (4) it is not
possible to use the time response from (5) since matrices A, B
and C are unknown. To deal with this type of uncertainty,
when matrices belong to a predefined set of polyhedrons, the
following theorem can be utilized:
Theorem 1: Consider an LTI system with uncertain param-
eters of the form:
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) (7)
y(t) = Cx(t).
where A ∈ <{A}, B ∈ <{B} and C ∈ <{C}. If a constant
input vector ui is connected to the system’s input at time t0
and x0 = x(t0), then for all t ≥ 0:
t ≥ 1||A˜|| ln
 |y(t0 + t)− y(t0)|
||C˜|| · (||x0||+ ||B˜ui||||Amin|| )
+ 1
 (8)
where:
A˜ = argmax
A∈ <{A}
||A||, B˜ = argmax
B∈ <{B}
||Bui||, C˜ = argmax
C∈ <{C}
||C||
(9)
Amin = argmin
A∈ <{A}
||A|| (10)
Proof: See appendix A
If x0 = x(t0) is known, the bound for tcrit can be computed
as shown in (8). However, in cases where only values y(t0)
and y(t0 + t) are known it is not possible to exactly determine
x0 since y(t0) = Cx0 and matrix C might not be invertible (as
in our case). In this case for a lower bound t˜crit we consider
a vector norm ||x˜0|| that is an upper bound on the maximal
norm vector x can take. To obtain this value we simulated the
patient’s dynamics when the patient parameters are initialized
as A = A˜ and B = B˜ (from (9)), since this configuration at
each time instance maximizes value for ||x˙|| from (1). Note
that the proposed bound on ||x0|| is very conservative as it
provides an upper bound on ||x(t)|| in the general case (i.e.,
2Although we can not guarantee that the uncertainty bound (i.e., 10%) can
be used to model all types of uncertainties in the Patient model, we have opted
to use it as it provides a way to model different types of patients. However, if
Patient’s dynamics (i.e., pharmacokinetics) is better understood for particular
types of patient populations, a new uncertainty bound can be easily adopted.
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for the reachable domain) and not only in points where y(t0) =
Cx0. However, as we will see later, even with this bound it
is possible to guarantee the safety requirement.
When the pump is continuously delivering the drug it is
possible to compute a lower bound for tcrit using Theorem 1.
In this case, the safety conditions will be satisfied if:
tPOdel + tnet + tSup + tnet + tPump + tP2PO + tpi ≤ t˜crit
where:
t˜crit =
1
||A˜|| ln
 |∆H
SpO2 |
SpO2gain
||C˜|| ·
(
||x˜0||+ ||B˜ui||||Amax||
) + 1
 (11)
and SpO2gain = 0.35 · 5.8 = 2.03 is the gain used in linear
mapping between drug level and SpO2 level (from Figure 5).
The value for ||A˜min|| can be easily obtained in polynomial
time as the solution of the appropriate convex optimization
problems (i.e., using existing, very efficient methods for
convex optimization). To solve this optimization problem on
the predefined regions <{A} we used CVX, a package for
specifying and solving convex programs [13] and obtained the
value ||A˜|| = 7.34 ·10−3. On the other hand, it is not possible
to utilize efficient methods for convex optimization to obtain
||A˜||, ||B˜ui|| and ||C˜||, as Amax, B, C are arguments of the
maximizations over convex functions. However, to compute
these values the following theorem can be used:
Theorem 2: Consider the optimization problem:
max
A∈ <{A}
||A||
where <{A} is defined as in (6).3 Then, there exists an optimal
solution Amax which is a vertex of polyhedron <{A}.
Proof: See appendix B.
From the previous theorem to compute ||A˜|| it is necessary
to calculate ||A|| in all 2n2 vertices of the polyhedron. In
our case, after computing the norm in 29 = 512 points, we
obtained ||A˜|| = 8.97 · 10−3. Similarly, after computing the
norm in 2 points for both ||Bui|| and ||C|| it was obtained
||B˜ui|| = 0.0917, ||C˜|| = 1.100. Furthermore, after matri-
ces A˜, B˜, C˜ are determined using the previously described
approach we obtained the value ||x˜0|| = 27.08. Therefore, in
our model t˜crit = 24.83 s ≈ 0.41 min. Note that this bound is
significantly lower than tcrit calculated for the ‘fixed’ patient
model (which was 9.68 minutes). As mentioned before, this
bound can be improved if ||x˜0|| is calculated only at points
where Cx0 = y(t0). However, even with this conservative
bound, the value for tcrit satisfies the safety requirement if
communication delay imposed by the network can be bounded.
Remark 2: Note that the bound provided in (11) can be
improved using the approach presented in [14]. In addition,
this approach can be also used in cases where a non-constant
drug flow is delivered to the patient. However, the flexibility
comes with a higher computational cost required by this
procedure. Finally, if we are given a complex patient model in
Simulink (e.g., a nonlinear system with uncertain parameters
or a nondeterministic system) from which it is not possible
to analytically determine tcrit, simulation of the Patient’s
behavior can be employed (as seen in Figure 6). As simulation
3Note that matrix A does not have to be a square matrix.
results depend on input signals and the model’s initial state, it
is essential that the worst-case scenario is known. Otherwise,
methods similar to the one from [15] can be used.
3) Safety conditions for the second Supervisor design: As
described in Section II, for the second Supervisor design the
pump is configured to stay activated only for a predefined fixed
duration of time. In addition, Supervisor stops the pump only
if the patient is in the Alarming region. In this case, the safety
requirement is satisfied if at least one of the two conditions are
met. The first condition is described in (4) and it is equivalent
to the safety condition for the first Supervisor design. The
second safety requirement is that the PCA activation period,
(i.e., duration of the drug flow) tdur, satisfies the requirement
that it can not drive the Patient from the Safe region to the
Critical region. This condition can be described as tdur ≤
tcrit. Therefore, the second safety requirement is satisfied if:
tdur ≤ t˜crit, (12)
with t˜crit defined as in (11).
4) Limitations of system verification in Simulink: Currently
there does not exist a holistic approach for verification of
nondeterministic hybrid systems, with uncertain parameters,
modeled in Simulink. Most of the existing tools use procedures
like Instrumentation Based Verification [16] where monitors
are designed to check whether the safety conditions are
violated. However, since this approach utilizes coverage-based
testing, it can be used only in combination with tools for
automatic test data generation. Several such commercial (e.g.,
Reactis, Design Verifier) and non-commercial (e.g. [15]) tools
exist. These tools do not guarantee full coverage of the design
state-space.
On the other hand, from the safety conditions described
in (4), (12) it can be concluded that safety of the closed-
loop system can be mapped into analysis of timing relations
between the system’s components. Therefore, we have opted to
use UPPAAL [3] for the verification of the closed-loop system.
However, when UPPAAL is used for the system’s verification
it is necessary to guarantee that the patient model in UPPAAL
over-approximates the patient’s dynamics with respect to the
utilized control algorithm (details are provided in the next
section). Finally, it is worth noting here that UPPAAL also
allows development of more detailed system models since it
inherently supports composition of asynchronous components.
IV. VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION OF COMPONENTS
AND SYSTEM IN UPPAAL
This section describes the UPPAAL model developed for
the case study verification. The structure of the model follows
the architecture of the system. For each component in Figure 2,
the model includes a separate automaton. The automata com-
municate using synchronization channels and shared variables.
Figure 7 shows the network of automata and communication
between them. Solid arrows represent communication channels
and dashed arrows represent shared variables.
A. UPPAAL Component Models
1) PCA Automaton: The automaton, which models the
pump, is shown in Figure 8. When the pump is operational,
it is either in the state running, with the shared variable
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PCA
sampleready
Patient
Pulse 
Oximeter
samplebuffer
P2PCA_bolus
pca_rate
Caregiver
CG2PCA_program
S2NW_stop
CG2PCA_start
Supervisor
resultready_n
Network
CG2S_clear
S2NW_clear
po_result_n
po_resultresultready
NW2PCA_clearNW2PCA_stop
Fig. 7. Communication structure of the UPPAAL model.
pca_rate set to default rate, or in the state bolusing,
when pca_rate is increased by the bolus rate. Both rates
are specified as parameters of the model. Furthermore, by
setting the appropriate value for time mode the pump can
be set (at configuration, not runtime) to work in the both
previously mentioned modes. In the first mode the pump is
kept continuously on (i.e., in bolusing state) until stopped
by the Supervisor, while in the second mode the pump
can be bolusing for a fixed duration given by the value of
the bolus_time parameter. The pump transitions to the
bolusing state upon the signal received from the patient
only if it is in the running state; in all other states, the signal
is ignored. From either running or bolusing state, the
pump can move to a stopped state (Rstopped or Bstopped,
respectively) upon a signal from the network.
2) PO Automaton: The automaton, which represents the
pulse oximeter, is shown in Figure 10. The operation of the
automaton proceeds in rounds. Each round begins by setting
the window size for the round based on the last sampled value.
Then, the automaton collects the number of samples to fill the
window. Samples are obtained periodically with the interval of
1 time unit, which corresponds to 100 ms. Finally, the result
is stored in the po_result variable and delivered to the
supervisor using the resultready channel.
3) Network and Caregiver Automata: The network is mod-
eled using two automata. Communication from the Supervisor
to the pump is modeled with automaton from Figure 9. The
automaton implements a two-place buffer, which means that
there may be two network messages in transit. The stop mes-
sage may be dropped by the network, if the boolean parameter
drop is set to true. We do not model dropping of the restart
message, since the loss of these messages does not affect
RstoppedOD
BstoppedOD
bolusing
(bolus_clock <= default_bolus_time)
running
programmed
on
NW2PCA_stop?
pca_rate:=0
P2PCA_bolus?
pca_rate := pca_rate + default_bolus_rate,
bolus_clock := 0
NW2PCA_stop?
(bolus_clock >= default_bolus_time) 
and (not time_mode)
pca_rate:= 0
NW2PCA_clear ?
NW2PCA_clear ?
P2PCA_bolus ?
P2PCA_bolus ?
P2PCA_bolus ?
NW2PCA_clear ?
pca_rate := default_rate(bolus_clock >= default_bolus_time) and time_modepca_rate := default_rate
NW2PCA_clear ?
pca_rate := default_rate
NW2PCA_stop ?
pca_rate := 0
CG2PCA_start ?
pca_rate := default_rate
CG2PCA_programmed ?
Fig. 8. Timed automaton for the PCA pump.
SC
stop_clock <= OD_delay
CS
clear_clock <= OD_delay
S
stop_clock <= OD_delay
C
clear_clock <= OD_delay
E
drop
S2NW_stop ?
drop
S2NW_stop ?
stop_clock >= OD_delay
NW2PCA_stop!
clear_clock >= OD_delay
NW2PCA_clear !
stop_clock >= OD_delay
NW2PCA_stop !
clear_clock >= OD_delay
NW2PCA_clear !
S2NW_clear ?
clear_clock := 0
S2NW_stop ?
stop_clock := 0
S2NW_stop ?
stop_clock := 0
S2NW_clear ?
clear_clock := 0
Fig. 9. Timed automaton for the network.
the safety of the patient. If messages are not dropped, they
are delivered by the network in order. A similar automaton
(not shown here) is used to introduce a bounded delay for
PO measurements (i.e., po_result). Again, messages can
be dropped if drop is set to true. The Caregiver automaton,
not shown here, contains one state and can send any of the
messages at any time. The messages include PCA pump and
Supervisor configuration commands (e.g., CG2PCA_start,
CG2S_clear). A more detailed model of the caregiver may
include data-dependent behaviors, for example, the clear signal
may be sent only if the SpO2 reading is high enough. However,
any other model will have fewer behaviors than the caregiver
model used here, and thus the safety property will still hold.
4) Supervisor Automaton: The Supervisor automaton,
shown in Figure 11, implements the simple control algorithm.
Upon receiving a SpO2 reading from the pulse oximeter, the
supervisor compares it with the pre-defined threshold value
and, if the result is too low, sends the stop message to the pump
across the network. The model also incorporates a delay, which
represents the worst-case execution time of the supervisor
algorithm. Then, once the caregiver resolves the problem, the
supervisor sends another message to restart the pump. For
simplicity of the presentation, the Supervisor automaton only
deals with SpO2, not heart rates.
5) Patient Automaton: The Patient automaton, shown in
Figure 12, periodically updates the drug level based on the
flow rate of the pump and drug absorption rate. In addition, at
any time, the model can deliver a sample as the function of the
current drug level. The designed model implements a linear
patient dynamics, which does not match the more realistic
Simulink model. An important question that needs to be
addressed is the consistency between the two models. Since the
UPPAAL model of the controller uses significantly simplified
patient dynamics, there is the possibility that verification
results obtained on the UPPAAL model would not apply to
the more detailed model and thus the system itself. Therefore,
in the remaining of this subsection we address initialization of
the Patient’s and PCA pump automatons.
po_choice
pump_cleared
s_clock <= s_delay
pump_stopped
waiting_for_result
po_result >= spo2_threshold
po_result < spo2_threshold
s_clock := 0
resultready?
local_spo2 := po_result
S2NW_clear !
CG2S_clear ?
s_clock >= s_delay
S2NW_stop!
Fig. 11. Timed automaton for the supervisor.
TECHNICAL REPORT, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 9
s11
s10
lclock <= 1
s9
lclock <= 1
s2
lclock <= 1
s5
lclock <= 1
s7
lclock <= 1
setwindowsize
s8
lclock <= 1
s4
lclock <= 1
s1 lclock <=1
s3
lclock <= 1
s6 lclock <= 1
i > windowsize
resultready!
po_result := sum / i
po_result < 85
i := 0 , windowsize := 4 , lclock := 0 , sum := 0
po_result < 90 and po_result > 84
i := 0 , windowsize := 6 , lclock := 0 , sum := 0
po_result < 94 and po_result > 89
i := 0 , windowsize := 7 , lclock := 0 , sum := 0
po_result < 97 and po_result > 93
i := 0 , windowsize := 8 , lclock := 0 , sum := 0
po_result > 96
i := 0 , windowsize := 10 , lclock := 0 , sum := 0
lclock >= 1 and i <= windowsize
sampleready?
sum := sum + samplebuffer , i := i + 1 , lclock := 0
lclock >= 1  and i <= windowsize
sampleready?
sum := sum + samplebuffer , i := i + 1 , lclock := 0
i > windowsize
resultready!
po_result := sum / i
lclock >= 1 and i <= windowsize
sampleready?
sum := sum + samplebuffer , i := i + 1 , lclock := 0
i > windowsize
resultready!
po_result := sum / i
lclock >= 1 and i <= windowsize
sampleready?
sum := sum + samplebuffer , i := i + 1 , lclock := 0
i > windowsize
resultready!
po_result := sum / i
lclock >= 1 and i <= windowsize
sampleready?
sum := sum + samplebuffer , i := i + 1 , lclock := 0
i > windowsize
resultready!
po_result := sum / i
lclock >= 1  and i <= windowsize
sampleready?
sum := sum + samplebuffer , i := i + 1 , lclock := 0
i > windowsize
resultready!
po_result := sum / i
lclock >= 1 and i <= windowsize
sampleready?
sum := sum + samplebuffer , i := i + 1 , lclock := 0
i > windowsize
resultready!
po_result := sum / i
lclock >= 1 and i <= windowsize
sampleready?
sum := sum + samplebuffer , i := i + 1 , lclock := 0
i > windowsize
resultready!
po_result := sum / i
lclock >= 1 and i <= windowsize
sampleready?
sum := sum + samplebuffer , i := i + 1 , lclock := 0
i > windowsize
resultready!
po_result := sum / i
lclock >= 1 and i <= windowsize
sampleready?
sum := sum + samplebuffer , i := i + 1 , lclock := 0
resultready!
po_result := sum / i
Fig. 10. Timed automaton for the pulse oximeter.
6) Initializing model parameters: To determine values for
the parameters of Patient and PCA pump automatons we
consider the Patient’s behavior with respect to the safety re-
quirements. From the safety analysis provided in the previous
section for both designed controllers (i.e., both Supervisor
designs), it can be reasoned that the focus of interest for the
safety conditions is with the patient’s behavior in the Alarming
region. In both of these cases it is required that the minimal
time that the Patient can spend in the region is bounded by
a value t˜crit (from (11)). Therefore, the value of t˜crit, the
minimal time it takes for the patient to be overdosed, is an
important consistency check for the models.
In the UPPAAL model, the value of tcrit may be different
(we denote it tUcrit). This value can be obtained from the
Patient model as:
tUcrit =
⌈
∆HSpO2/SpO2gain
PCA rateON − ab rate
⌉
, (13)
where PCA rateON = default bolus rate +
default rate and dxe denotes the smallest integer greater
than or equal to x. To guarantee consistency between
the UPPAAL and Simulink models, the value for tUcrit
has to be no greater than then the previously obtained
value t˜crit. Therefore, from condition tUcrit ≤ t˜crit and
(13), we can derive the condition for the UPPAAL model
start
p_clock <= 1
sampleready !
samplebuffer := 100 - drug_level
drug_level < pain_thresh
P2PCA_bolus !
drug_level := drug_level +pca_rate >= ab_rate ?
        drug_level + pca_rate - ab_rate : 0,
p_clock := 0
drug_level >= pain_thresh
drug_level := drug_level 
                + pca_rate - ab_rate,
p_clock := 0
p_clock >= 1
Fig. 12. Timed automaton for the patient.
parameters (default bolus rate and default rate from
PCA automaton and ab rate from the Patient automaton).
In our case, tUcrit turns out to be 20 seconds for the initial
values of the parameters that described patient dynamics and
drug flow (pca rate = 3, ab rate = 2), which is an order
of magnitude smaller than t˜crit. Clearly, the UPPAAL model
overestimates the rate of change for the drug level in the
patient body. And, since the system has been proven safe
in this case, it would also be safe in a more realistic case.
However, since we want to more realistically mimic the patient
behavior in the Alarming region it is necessary to set the
parameters in a way that:⌈
∆HSpO2/SpO2gain
PCA rateON − ab rate
⌉
=
⌊
t˜crit
⌋
(14)
This also allows relaxation of timing requirements imposed
on other components in the control loop. For example, with
this value it is possible to relax the value for the bound on
network imposed delay (tnet) from Table I.
In addition, it is necessary to achieve consistency between
UPPAAL and the physical patient model in cases when the
pump is turned off. The goal is to minimize difference between
the times (obtained from UPPAAL and Simulink models) that
the patient would spend in the Alarming zone if the pump is
turned off at the boundary of the Critical zone. Similarly as in
the previous case, the condition that relates UPPAAL model
parameters with the patient model from (1) can be obtained
from (11) where ui = 0 (i.e., drug delivery is turned of):⌈
∆HSpO2/SpO2gain
rate down
⌉
=
⌊
1
||A˜|| ln
( |∆HSpO2 |/SpO2gain
||C˜|| · ||x˜0||
+ 1
)⌋
(15)
where rate down = ab rate−default bolus rate. Finally,
from (14), (15) the parameters for PCA and Patient automaton
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in the UPPAAL model can be obtained.
B. Verifying PCA System Safety Properties
The main safety property that needs to be verified on the
UPPAAL model is whether or not the patient can enter the
Critical region, where SpO2 and heart rate are low enough to
indicate a respiratory arrest. Before verifying safety, however,
we perform several auxiliary checks to ensure model sanity.
We express properties we verify in the subset of the Com-
putational Tree Logic (CTL) [17] used by UPPAAL. The main
temporal operators of this logic that we use are Aφ, which
means that φ is satisfied in every state along every execution
path from the current state, and A♦φ, meaning that φ is
satisfied eventually along every path.
The first sanity check is the absence of deadlocks in the
model. Another sanity check is that once the SpO2 level goes
below the pain threshold, it eventually goes up. This property
is captured by the temporal logic formula
A(samplebuffer < pain thresh⇒
A♦samplebuffer ≥ pain thresh). (16)
Note that the property is defined in terms of the true SpO2
level as defined by the patient model, not the sensor reading
obtained by the supervisor. Intuitively, this property should
hold, because the normal infusion rate is lower than the drug
absorption rate. Once the patient stops requesting new boluses
and the last bolus infusion is over, the drug level will start
decreasing and thus SpO2 and heart rate levels should increase,
until they reach pain threshold again. Finally, we check that
the pump is stopped if the patient ever enters the alarming
region. Formally,
A(samplebuffer < alarm thresh⇒
A♦(PCA.Rstopped ∨ PCA.Bstopped)). (17)
We consider this property to be a sanity check rather than a
safety requirement, because wrong parameters of the model
– for example, too short bolus duration or too high drug
absorption rate – can make the system appear safe (that is,
SpO2 level never goes too low), but it would be safe for
the wrong reason. All sanity checks were passed by the
UPPAAL model described above when no dropped messages
are allowed. Clearly, property (17) does not hold if messages
can be dropped.
Finally, we turn to checking the main safety property. With
the threshold for the Critical region set to 70%, the property
A(samplebuffer ≥ critical) is satisfied if the stop message
cannot be dropped. However, if losing messages is enabled in
the network automaton, the property is not satisfied.
V. FAILURES AND FAIL-SAFE PCA SYSTEM
We have seen in Section IV that the system does not satisfy
its safety property if network messages can be lost. Also, it can
be observed from (4) that if any of the delays on the left side
of the equation is significantly increased, the condition would
not be satisfied. Increase in any of the delays can be caused
by a component or network failures, which would result in an
open-loop system.
To provide safety assurance realistic scenarios have to be
taken into account, where network failures occur or PO acci-
dentally gets detached from the Patient. Thus, the Supervisor’s
control algorithm and PCA pump’s designs have to guarantee
the system’s open-loop safety. For the case study this denotes
that even if the Supervisor does not receive the right values for
HR and/or SpO2 or the pump does not receive the command
to disable the drug flow, the system design has to guarantee
that the patient would not enter the Critical region. In addition,
open-loop safety implies that even if the patient keeps pressing
the button no drug flow will be enabled if there is a possibility
that the amount of infused drug can harm the patient.
One way to design the system that complies with open-
loop safety requirement is to make changes in the closed-
loop system from Figure 2. In the modified system the pump
receives activation command from the Supervisor (not the
Patient) along with the duration of the drug flow (which does
not have to be fixed). When the Patient presses the button if the
Supervisor is informed about current HR and SpO2 values it is
able to determine a duration of the pump’s activation (∆tsafe)
that guarantees the patient’s safety. An additional condition is
that the Supervisor will disregard the button press during tdel
units of time after the pump is stopped. Here, tdel takes into
account all the delays in the loop and is defined as follows:
tdel = tPOdel+ tnet+ tSup+ tnet+ tPump+ tP2PO+ tPCA2P
The imposed condition ensures that the last drug delivery will
take full effect before the next ‘button pressed’ command
is sent to the Supervisor. In addition, it implies that the
drug level function will reach its local maximum before HR
and SpO2 measurements sent to the Supervisor are obtained.
All constituents of tdel, except the network delay, can be
calculated as described in the previous Section. We assume
that if the message is delivered, the underlying real-time
network provides a guaranteed bound on the network delay,
as described in [5].
To calculate ∆tsafe the following parameters are utilized:
• hcur - last received SpO2 level,
• ∆h - worst case increase in SpO2 level due to system
latencies while the pump is off,
• ∆h(h0,∆t) - maximal SpO2 decrease cause by drug flow
of the duration ∆t when the initial SpO2 level is h0.
Therefore, to satisfy the safety requirement, ∆tsafe has to
meet the condition:
hcur + ∆h+ ∆h(hcur,∆tsafe) ≥ HSpO22 . (18)
It is worth noting that although we use SpO2 measurements
to calculate ∆tsafe, it is also possible to use HR measure-
ments, as the boundaries of the Critical region (i.e., HHR2
instead of HSpO22 ) correspond to same drug level values. The
requirement, that after the pump is stopped, the Supervisor will
disregard if the button is pressed for tdel time units, implies
that when the button pressed command is accepted when
∆h ≥ 0 (as SpO2 measurements decrease when drug level
decreases), since the drug level will reach its local maximum
before the measurements are taken. Therefore, the new safety
condition can be obtained from:
∆h(hcur,∆tsafe) ≥ HSpO22 − hcur (19)
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To determine ∆tsafe Theorem 1 can be utilized. In this case
Eq. (19) is satisfied if:
∆tsafe ≤ t˜safe = 1||A˜|| ln
 |HSpO22 − hcur|/SpO2gain
||C˜|| ·
(
||x˜0||+ ||B˜ui||||Amin||
) + 1

(20)
Obviously if hcur > H
SpO2
1 (H
SpO2
1 is the SpO2 threshold value
for the Alarming region) ∆tsafe would be greater than t˜crit.
Similarly, if the patient is already in the Alarming region
(hcur ≤ HSpO21 ) then ∆tsafe ≤ t˜crit.
The system guarantees open-loop safety since, even if some
(or all) of the messages are dropped, the patient would never
enter the Critical region. The reason is that the pump activation
command also contains the duration of the drug flow. In
addition, if the flow durations are calculated properly, the
pump will stop before safety requirement is breached.
To guarantee open-loop safety an assumption was made
that the Supervisor is able to determine whether received
measurements are valid. This is a reasonable assumption
because modern POs send an invalid code in cases when valid
measurements can not be obtained.4 Note that in this work we
do not consider failures where component’s behavior differs
from the behavior described by their models. For example,
if the pump is active longer than requested, or if PO does
not send an invalid code when it is unable to obtain valid
measurements.
The presented solution is not the only way to guarantee
open-loop safety. An alternative approach, which requires min-
imum change to existing PCA infusion pumps, is to have the
Supervisor instruct the pump to pump the maximum amount
of drugs that can be injected. Using a procedure similar to (20)
the Supervisor can easily calculate the maximum allowed drug
dosage. This system is also inherently fail-safe since the worst
consequence of failed network, Supervisor, or PO is no drug
injection, as in the previous case.
VI. RELATED WORK
Formal methods have traditionally been used for verification
of time-critical and safety-critical embedded systems [18].
However, until recently they have not been used for medical
device certification. Formal techniques have been applied to
improve medical device protocols [19] and safety [20]. In addi-
tion, in [8] the authors present the use of Extended Finite State
Machines for model checking of the Computer Automated
Resuscitation A medical device. Nonetheless, although these
papers consider relevant clinical application, in all of them
either a simplified patient model was utilized or the patient
was not modeled at all.
Continuous monitoring of the blood oxygenation of patients
receiving PCA infusions has been done in the past and even
commercially implemented. The Alaris 8210 SpO2 Module
connects to the Alaris 8000 pump controller and adds the
ability to pause infusions based on a target SpO2. Our ap-
proach shows how a similar system could be designed and
validated. In particular, while the available commercial system
is provided as a tightly-integrated system from a single vendor,
our approach could be used to design and validate systems
4Detachment of the probes from the patient’s body or movements of the
patient’s hand are main reasons why POs do not obtain valid values.
based on devices from multiple sources as long as the timing
and other necessary information is available.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have presented a clinically relevant case study of the
closed-loop control of a PCA infusion pump. To perform
safety analysis of the closed-loop medical system we have
used a model-driven approach that combines simulation-based
validation of a continuous-time system model in Simulink with
formal verification of a more abstract model using timed au-
tomata and the UPPAAL tool. In this case, the key to keeping
the two models consistent is to derive timing parameters of
the system from the Simulink model and use these constants
in the UPPAAL model.
For the case study, we have shown that the system is safe
under no failure assumptions. We identify how to deal with
some of the failures that manifest as unbounded delays. The
proposed method is based on the well-known notion of timed
lease used in fault-tolerant distributed systems. We believe that
such a technique can be applied to other tightly integrated
medical systems in which fail safe is essential.
The dynamics in the considered case study is relatively
simple. This choice is made on purpose, to better present
the steps in our approach, including the analysis of a system
with uncertain parameters. Given the simple case study, we
believe that our approach allows us to construct safety cases
for regulatory approval of closed-loop medical systems. With
more complicated dynamics, some of the steps become more
difficult; in particular, the derivation of timing parameters for
patient model with uncertain parameters may require more
sophisticated methods and further research may be required.
In this paper, we highlight the need for model-driven safety
analysis of the closed-loop medical systems and, on a specific
case study, we emphasize potential problems that might occur.
However, it it will be of interest to extend our approach to
more general closed-loop medical scenarios.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: Consider the LTI system from (7). The time
response at time t0 + t for all t ≥ 0 can be computed as
([21]):
x(t+ t0) = e
Atx0 +
∫ t0+t
t0
eA(t+t0−τ)Bu(τ)dτ.
Therefore, if u(t) = ui for all t ≥ t0, where ui is a constant
vector, the system evolution can be described as:
x(t+ t0)− x0 = (eAt − In)x0 +A−1(eAt − In)Bui (21)
where In ∈ Rn×n is n × n identity matrix. Due to the fact
that for matrices P, P1 and Q of the appropriate dimensions
||PQ|| ≤ ||P || · ||Q|| and ||P +Q|| ≤ ||P ||+ ||Q||, from (21)
it is possible to provide the following bound:
|y(t+ t0)− y(t0)| = |C(x(t+ t0)− x0)|
≤ ||C||||x(t+ t0)− x0|| (22)
Now, consider the term ||eAt− In||. From the definition of
the exponential function we can obtain:
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||eAt − In|| = ||
∞∑
k=0
(At)k
k!
− In|| = ||
∞∑
k=1
(At)k
k!
||
≤
∞∑
k=1
(||A||t)k
k!
=
∞∑
k=0
(||A||t)k
k!
− 1 = e||A||t − 1
(23)
Similarly it can be shown:
||A−1(eAt − In)|| ≤ ||A||−1(e||A||t − 1) (24)
From (22)-(24) it is possible to obtain a bound on the change
in the system’s output:
|y(t+ t0)− y(t0)| ≤ ||C||(e||A||t − 1)(||x0||+ ||A||−1||Bui||)
Therefore, from the previous equation:
t ≥ 1||A|| ln
( |y(t0 + t)− y(t0)|
||C|| · (||x0||+ ||Bui||||A||−1) + 1
)
(25)
for all matrices A, B and C that belong to the polyhedrons
<{A}, <{B} and <{C} respectively.
Eq. (25) provides a lower bound on the value t for which the
system output can progress from point y(t0) to the point y(t0+
t) for any values of the aforementioned matrices. The bound
is a function of the patient parameters (i.e., matrices A, B
and C). The goal is to provide the bound value that is the
minimum of the term on the right side of (25) for all matrices
A, B and C belonging to the corresponding polyhedrons.
The term on the right side of (25) decreases as the values
||A||, ||C||, ||x0|| , ||A||−1 and ||Bui|| increase. Note that
it is not possible to calculate the value for ||A|| that will
minimize the term. Thus, for simplicity two independent
problems are considered:
max
A∈<{A}
||A|| and max
A∈<{A}
||A||−1
As maxA∈<{A} ||A||−1 = 1minA∈<{A} ||A|| , by defining A˜, B˜,
C˜ as in the Theorem statement, Eq. (8) can be obtained.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: Assume that there exist a matrix A˜ =
argmaxA∈<{A} ||A||, such that A˜ is not a vertex and that
there does not exist a matrix A ∈ <{A} such that ||A|| =
||A˜||. Since A˜ is not a vertex and polyhedron <{A} is
bounded there exists a matrix element a˜ij such that
aˆij −∆aij < a˜ij < aˆij −∆aij . (26)
Denote with AˆL and AˆH matrices whose all elements are
equal to the appropriate elements from A˜ except the element
from ith row and jth column, and lets assume that these
elements are aˆLij = aˆij −  and aˆHij = aˆij + , where  > 0
is chosen such that aˆLij , aˆ
H
ij ∈ [aˆij − ∆aij , aˆij + ∆aij ]
(from (26) such  exists). Since A˜ is the unique minimization
argument for the optimization problem then ||A˜|| > ||AˆL||
and ||A˜|| > ||AˆH ||. Therefore:
||A˜|| > 1
2
(
||AˆL||+ ||AˆH ||
)
(27)
On the other hand since ||A|| is a convex function and from
the fact that A˜ = 12 (AˆL + AˆH) it can be concluded:
||A˜|| ≤ 1
2
(
||AˆL||+ ||AˆH ||
)
which is in contradiction with (27). Thus, for the optimization
problem there does not exist the unique minimization argument
that is not a vertex, implying that there exist an optimal
solution Amax that is a vertex of polyhedron <{A}.
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